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Non-Technical Summary
Patents are frequently viewed as major policy tool in order to stimulate R&D. In recent
years however, doubts emerged whether this is the case for all technology areas. Theoret-
ical research has shown that when research is sequential and cumulative, stronger patents
may in fact discourage follow-on inventions. So called patent thickets are accused to stifle
the commercialization of technology in innovations. These thickets refer to a multitude
of overlapping patent rights that an innovating firm requires access to.
Recent empirical research provides evidence that firms facing patent thickets have lower
innovation performance. By which mechanism patent thickets affect innovation activities
remains, however, unclear. Two mechanisms could cause such a negative impact: royality
stacking and hold-up threats. Using survey data of the Mannheim Innovation Panel for
German manufacturing firms and balance sheet data from Creditreform’s Dafne database,
I investigate whether investments in innovations are affected by proxies for the pervasive-
ness of royality stacking and hold-up threats. The former is empirically characterized in
terms of fragmented ownership of patent rights. The latter is characterized by differences
in fixed tangible assets between the downstream innovating firm and upstream owners of
relevant patents. This measure proxies for the maximum amount of accumulated sunk
investments that holding-up patent owners could expropriate.
I find that both measures, ownership fragmentation and differences in non-current, tangi-
bles assets, affect investments in innovation negatively. Ownership fragmentation reduces
innovative investments for firms with small patent portfolios. Capital stock differences
reduce investments in innovation for firms with large patent portfolios. Differences in
fixed capital reduce investments in innovation irrespective whether they refer to blocking
or non-blocking patent owners and irrespective to size characteristics of the cited patent
owners.
These effects are specific to investments in innovation. There are no comparable effects on
investments in R&D or residual physical investments. This evidence suggests that nega-
tive effects of patent thickets on innovation are not uniform and depend on characteristics
of the innovating firm.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Vergabe von Patentrechten ist ein wichtiges Instrument zur staatlichen Fo¨rderung von
Forschungs-und Entwicklungsta¨tigkeiten (FuE). Allerdings hat die theoretische Forschung
gezeigt, dass sta¨rkere Patentrechte FuE-Anreize sogar mindern ko¨nnen, wenn Erfindungen
sequenziell und kumulativ auf a¨lteren FuE-Ergebnissen aufbauen. So genannte Patent-
dickichte sollen die Kommerzialisierung neuer Technologie in innovativen Produkten und
Prozessen behindern. Diese Patentdickichte bestehen aus einer Vielzahl sich u¨berlappen-
der Patentrechte, zu denen ein Innovator Zugang beno¨tigt.
Obwohl Evidenz vorliegt, dass Firmen die sich Patentdickichten gegenu¨ber sehen weniger
erfolgreich innovativ ta¨tig sind ist weiterhin unklar woraus dieser negative Effekt resultiert.
Zwei Eigenschaften von Patentdickichten ko¨nnten dies bewirken. Zum einen ko¨nnten zu
viele Parteien Anspru¨che anmelden. Zum anderen ko¨nnten Dritte unerwartet den In-
novationsprozess blockieren und Innovationsrenten abscho¨pfen. Diese Arbeit untersucht,
inwieweit Investitionen in Innovationen von diesen zwei Facetten von Patentdickichten
beeintra¨chtigt werden. Dazu verwende ich Daten aus dem Mannheimer Innovationpanel
sowie Bilanzinformationen aus der Dafnedatenbank u¨ber deutsche Firmen im verarbeit-
enden Gewerbe. Empirisch abgebildet werden die verschiedenen Facetten eines Patent-
dickichts zum Einen als Fragmentierungsindex der Patentinhaber, zum Anderen u¨ber
Unterschiede in den Sachanlagevermo¨gen zwischen Patentinhabern und nachgeordneten
Firmen. Die Gefahr unerwarteter Blockaden kann gegeben sein, wenn die versunkenen
Investitionen der Patentinhaber geringer sind als die der nachgeordneten Innovatoren.
Letzteres Maß kann als Obergrenze fu¨r durch Blockaden abscho¨pfbare Renten angesehen
werden.
Es zeigt sich, dass Innovationsinvestitionen mit steigender Fragmentierung seltener wer-
den. Dies ist vor allem der Fall fu¨r Firmen mit kleinen Patentportfolios. Unterschiedliche
Kapitalbesta¨nde zwischen Patentinhabern und nachgeordneten Firmen verringern die
Neigung, in Innovation zu investieren. Letzters ist vor allem fu¨r Firmen mit großen
Patentbesta¨nden von Bedeutung. Dieser negative Effekt unterschiedlicher Kapitalbesta¨nde
bleibt gegeben, auch wenn nur blockierende oder nicht-blockierende Patentinhaber betra-
chtet werden. Auch die Gro¨ße der Patentinhaber beeinflusst den negativen Effekt nicht.
Diese negativen Effekte der Charakteristika von Patentdickichten sind spezifisch fu¨r ph-
ysische Investitionen in Innovationen. Es finden sich keine vergleichbaren Effekte auf son-
stige physische Investitionen oder auf FuE-Ta¨tigkeit. Der negative Einfluss von Patent-
dickichten auf die Innovationsta¨tigkeit von Firmen kann nicht als gleichfo¨rmig angesehen
werden und ha¨ngt von den Charakteristika des nachgeordneten Innovators ab.
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Abstract
Innovation is commercialization of technology. Imperfections in markets for techno-
logy should leave marks on physical investments for innovation. Two types of
transaction costs could affect innovative investments: royality stacking and hold-up
threats. Backward references in firm’s patent portfolio indicate potential technology
suppliers. I find a negative effect of ownership fragmentation on investments related
to innovation for firms with small patent portfolios. Hold-up threats are credible
when upstream patentees have less specific capital sunk than innovating firms. Dif-
ferences in fixed capital stocks between downstream firms and upstream patentees
negatively affect investments in innovation for firms with large patent portfolios.
These effects are specific to investments in innovation. There are no comparable ef-
fects on investments in R&D or residual physical investments. The effects of patent
thickets on innovation are thus not uniform. They depend on the characteristics of
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1 Introduction
Does access to complementary assets necessarily imply a privileged share in the distri-
bution of innovation rents? At first glance, Teece’s (1986) seminal work regarding the
impact of appropriability regimes and complementary assets on the distribution of inno-
vation rents seems to imply this conclusion. However, Teece (1986) and Gans and Stern
(2003) focus their discussion on a unilateral dependence of technology suppliers on in-
cumbent owners of complementary assets. These complementary assets thereby serve as
gatekeepers to a successful commercialization of technologies. In this case, inventors are
held up from commercializing their technology, because they lack complementary assets
such as distribution networks, manufacturing equipment, or brand-name reputation.1,2
On the other hand, imperfections in the market for technology (Gans and Stern 2010)
may also lead to situations where the owner of complementary assets is held up by techno-
logy suppliers that own relevant patents. In this case, downstream innovators may find
themselves unilaterally dependent on access to single intellectual property rights (e. g.
Shapiro 2001). A prominent example is the case of the Blackberry producer Research in
Motion (RIM). In the year 2000, when RIM was already producing its devices, the patent-
holding company NTP (which was founded in 1992) sent notice of infringed patents to
RIM. Although doubts have been raised on the validity of NTP’s patents, the threat of
shutting down their operations induced RIM to agree on a settlement payment of $ 612.5
mln. This study aims to investigate, whether firms perceive such hold up threats when
deciding about investments that are targeted to the introduction of innovations.
During the last two decades, firms have increasingly been turning to external markets
for technology developments (Arora et al. 2001, Chesbrough 2003). Whether there are
transactional hazards in the market for technology that leave potential benefits unreaped
is therefore an important research question. This literature on technology markets, how-
ever, has primarily focused on the expropriation risks that inventors face (Arrow 1962,
Mowery 1983). Contrarily, this study investigates whether downstream innovators face
such expropriation risks, too. The focus of the managerial literature on expropriation
risks on technology market’s supply side is surprising, since this literature usually regards
complementary assets as co-specialized. In this case however, technology suppliers de-
pend on access to complementary assets, as well as their downstream owners depend on
1In his original article, Teece (1986) already mentioned the possibility that the dependence may not
be solely unilateral of the form that the technology supplier is dependent on access to complementary
assets owned by incumbent innovators. He already indicated that the owner of specialized assets may
equally well be dependent on technology of others. However, the discussion in the literature of mediating
effects from access to specialized assets focuses to the best of my knowledge on the former case.
2A prominent example is the lost innovation race of EMI that developed the first tomographic scanner.
Only after EMI lost its independence and incumbents took over the market with imitative innovations,
they were granted damages for patent infringements.
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access to the technology. Complementary assets are therefore co-specialized when there
is a mutual dependence between technology supplier and downstream innovator. This
mutual dependence implies that downstream innovators have to take expropriation risks
into account in their decision to invest in complementary assets. This is the case because
the innovator finds himself in a disadvantaged bargaining situation with residual patent-
owning technology suppliers, while having already invested in complementary assets. In
such ex post negotiations, failure of negotiations leaves downstream innovator with the
incurred costs of adapting its equipment to specific technology. Residual patent owners
can therefore expropriate innovation rents to the extent of these specific investments.3
Firms perceiving such hold up threats should be less likely to invest in complementary
assets.
This study contributes to a growing literature that analyzes the mediating role of com-
plementary assets in boundaries of firm decisions.4 The literature largely focuses on the
effects of complementary assets on propensities to collaborate or license from the per-
spective of the technology supplier (e. g. Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006, Gans et al. 2002).
Whether the demand-side for specialized technology is affected by expropriation risks is
still an unanswered question. Ziedonis (2004) demonstrated that capital-intensive owners
of complementary assets safeguard their access to the underlying technology more ag-
gressively, when transaction costs in the market for technology are high. There is some
evidence that imperfections in the market for technologies hinder the adoption of new
technologies in innovative products and processes (Cockburn et al. 2010). Whether diffu-
sion of technology is impeded by hold-up threats or by other transaction costs is, however,
an open question.
This study integrates insights from managerial strategy literature of innovation with a
transaction cost and property rights perspective of technology markets (cf. Madhok,
2002). I investigate whether innovative investments are affected by differences in sunk
capital between potential technology suppliers and downstream innovators, since a lower
amount of sunk investments by patentees is a necessary condition for their hold up threats
to be credible. Section 2.1 discusses why and when investments in complementary assets
could result in a risk of expropriation rather than create competitive advantage. Section
2.2 describes why a sequential and cumulative invention process that creates patent thick-
ets could create transaction costs. Section 3 shows the empirical findings of this study.
3On the other hand, if licensing negotiations take place before the owner of complementary assets
adapted it to a specific technology, we find ourselves in the classical case of an inventor facing the risk of
expropriation by an incumbent owner of complementary assets.
4For a general overview of the empirical literature on the boundaries of the firm (i. e. whether parts
of the value chain, like e. g. R&D, are organizationally independent or integrated) see Lafontaine and
Slade (2007).
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They reveal that patent thicket effects are not uniform. Firms with small patent portfolios
reduce investments in innovation as a result of ownership fragmentation, whereas firms
with large patent portfolio reduce innovative investments as a result of differences in sunk
capital between them and upstream patentees.
2 Hypothesis development
The resource and competence based view of the firm in the strategic management lit-
erature largely regards downstream complementary assets as source of competitive ad-
vantage. Their adaptation to specific uses makes them hard to imitate for potential
entrants (Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1986, Dierickx and Cool 1989). Complementary assets
are, however, only a source of competitive advantage when they are specialized, i. e. are
not easily tradeable and are therefore associated with a certain amount of sunk, non-
recoverable expenditures. Technology suppliers with their sunk R&D expenditures thus
face expropriation risks when complementary assets are necessary to commercialize the
technology. On the other hand, the resource based view of the firm takes complementary
assets as already established. When deciding to invest in assets that are adapted to spe-
cific technology, however, the downstream innovator has to take the exclusion rights of
patentees in the respective technology into account. So, at this point in time when the
investment decision is made, there is a mutual dependence between technology suppliers
and downstream innovators instead of a unilateral dependence when complementary as-
sets are already established. Whether investments in complementary assets are affected
by this dependence on technology suppliers, this study aims to investigate empirically.
Naturally, downstream innovators have strong incentives to secure access to the necessary
technology before investing into the adaptation of assets to this technology. However, re-
cent evidence suggests that transaction costs restrict a broader market for technologies to
emerge (Gambardella et al., 2007). These market imperfections should also be reflected
in the propensity to invest in complementary assets. Patent rights are only imperfect
property rights. They provide a right to exclude others solely, but do not (and cannot)
confer rights to use and rights to its benefits. Thus, the downstream innovator may find
herself in a position in which she licensed-in relevant technology, but still does not possess
the right to use the technology, because other patentees have further exclusion rights.
This may happen particullary in complex technologies in which it is difficult to protect
technology by a limited number of patent rights (Levin et al. 1987). Complex technolo-
gies are susceptible to generate patent thickets in view an escalating number of patent
applications (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Shapiro (2001) defines such thickets as
’
a dense
web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through
3
in order to actually commercialize new technology‘. Patent thickets could thus create
transaction costs in the market for technologies. Demand for technology then reduces
according to the perceived probability to be held up and investments in complementary
assets diminish accordingly.
2.1 Hold up Expectations
Transaction costs can emerge when unprogrammed adaptation, lock-in and appropriable
quasi-rents, that could be haggled over are present (Joskow, 1991). In other words, pre-
conditions for transaction costs are sequential and irreversible actions that are targeted to
specific outcomes but cannot be fully contracted upon ex-ante. In the case of technology
transactions, these sequential, irreversible actions refer to sunk investments of both mar-
ket sides: The technology supplier sunk expenditures in R&D and the ‘commercializer
of technology’ sunk expenditures in the adaption of assets to become complementary to
a certain technology. These sunk investments create a lock-in situation. A successful
transaction, however, creates quasi-rents, i. e. rents that do not arise in other factor com-
binations, but only in those when specific technology is matched with specific assets.
Specific investments in complementary assets pose the risk of expropriation, when the
downstream innovator cannot contract upon the technology fully ex ante. Such an in-
complete contract with regard to the necessary technology can be due to the fact that the
downstream innovator herself does not anticipate all the necessary technological inputs
at the outset of the innovation project (Rosenberg, 1998). Since the innovation process
is a recursive one (Kline and Rosenberg 1986), new information regarding actual cus-
tomer needs can emerge during the process. This is associated with altering the technical
specifications of innovations and may require adaptations of downstream assets with the
associated need to access further technology. Lacking technology access and the resulting
risk of expropriation of the downstream innovator can just as well be due to the imperfect
property characteristics of intellectual property. At the heart of this imperfection lies
the inability of intellectual property to transfer usage rights of technology. Instead, only
rights to exclude can be transferred. A downstream innovator has an implicit right to use
the technology, when no patentee holds further exclusion rights. This distinction between
usage and exclusion rights of technology is especially important in patent thickets, since
there may patents that the innovator overlooked to license-in but that partly overlap with
the technology underlying its investments in complementary assets. Lemley and Shapiro
(2005) notice that complex technologies are susceptible to such an uncertainty regarding
the scope of patent rights. When the innovator cannot be sure whether marginal patents
juridically overlap with the core technology she adapted her assets to, the diffuse entitle-
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ment theory (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) predicts that under-investing is the only feasible
option.
When deciding to invest in the adaptation of assets to specific technology, the downstream
innovator thus has to take the expropriation risk from technology suppliers into account.
The magnitude of expropriation risks depend on innovator’s relative dependence to resid-
ual patentee’s technology. In other words, is the innovator more dependent on patentee’s
technology or is the patentee more dependent on complementary assets? To which mar-
ket side the mutual dependence swings depends on each side’s specific investments. The
maximum amount that can be expropriated from downstream manufacturers are the ex-
penses she incurred for adapting her assets to specific technology and expenses she would
incur in case of switching to other technology suppliers.5 Patentees of residual exclusion
rights for which it is unclear whether they overlap with complementary asset’s underly-
ing technology, can expropriate this maximum amount only if they themselves have not
sunk specific investments. The more the technology use is restricted to limited number of
downstream innovators, the more dependent is the technology supplier, since the supplier
cannot recover her sunk R&D expenditures. Despite innovator’s specific investments in
complementary assets, these are not subject to expropriation risks when the holding up
patentee has incurred at least as much R&D expenditures. Differences in the amount of
sunk investments therefore determine on which market side the expropriation risk lies (cf.
Acemoglu et al., 2010).
The case of RIM being held up by NTP illustrates this point. RIM already invested in its
capital-intensive production facilities and was already producing its devices when NTP
claimed patent infringement. NTP’s patent portfolio, however, was presumed to be of
low technological value. Accordingly, associated R&D by NTP has been lower than in-
vestments in machinery and equipment incurred by RIM. This difference in threat points
explains why RIM agreed to a licensing deal that presumably overvalued the intrinsic
economic value of NTP’s patents. Concerns regarding such hold-up threats have been
growing in recent years (e. g. Lemley and Shapiro 2007).6 Reitzig et al. (2007) show
that current legal rules for determining damage awards overcompensate infringed patent
holders. In this case, it is frequently more profitable to trap R&D intensive manaufac-
tures in infringement situations than to negotiate licenses before production takes place.
Such a systematic overcompensation especially prevails in jurisdictions (like Germany)
5The residual unspecifity of innovator’s assets does not generate a competitive advantage. However,
it can be freely traded and therefore liquidized. Consequently, unspecific assets are not subject to expro-
priation risks.
6Cf. also ‘Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction’ (2006), Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, & Intellectual Property of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives 109th
Congress, Serial no. 109-105.
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that grant damage awards not only on the basis of lost profits or reasonable royality rates
but also allow patentees to recover infringers’ profits (based on the legal fiction that the
infringer undertook business on behalf of the patentee).7
Successful R&D activities should result in patent rights, that cite the technological know-
ledge the firm developed further, also in technologies in which patents are not the most
important appropriation mechanism (Cohen et al. 2000). These references refer to the
most essential patents in the technology and therefore to those ones that are most likely to
be in-licensend when commercializing the technology. When innovator’s patents are not
radical enough, she needs an agreement with the owners of cited patents (cf. next section).
Grindley and Teece (1997) observe that firms manage their IP portfolios more proactively.
Safeguarding their freedom to operate from hold-up threats drives this more proactive
stance towards IP management. Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) show that cross-licensing is
more prevalent between symmetric and large firms. The effectiveness of creating large
patent portfolios to secure freedom to operate can therefore be limited. Accordingly,
when the innovating firm has sunk more capital than the technology supplier (i. e. when
market sides are asymmetric), threats to hold up the innovator are credible. The preva-
lent proactive stance towards IP managament should guarantee that patent portfolios
nevertheless provide a reliable data source for the technological basis of firm’s business
activities. Therefore, I will test the following hypothesis:
H1: Investments in complementary assets decrease with increasing difference of capital
stocks between innovator and patentees of relevant technology.
2.2 Royality Stacking
So far, we have considered imperfections in the market for technologies due to differences
in sunk costs between technology suppliers and downstream innovators. However, the
provision of patent rights does not only facilitate technology transactions. The associated
disclosure of technology also serves as basis for other researchers. They can build upon
this knowledge in cumulative way to further develop the technology and avoids them to
bear duplicative R&D expenditures (Scotchmer 1991). This may lead to situations of hav-
ing follow-on inventors been granted exclusion rights, who have at the same time not the
right to use the follow-on technology, because the initial patent-holder blocks its usage.
Blocking patent rights may therefore not only result from difficulties to codify the devel-
opments and discoveries into patented claims but may also reflect the division of labour
with respect to inventive activity and its sequential and cumulative nature. In this case,
7See Reitzig et al. (2007) for an extensive discussion of different legislations for calculating patent
damage awards.
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transaction costs do not originate from coordination between the downstream innovating
firm and a single residual IP-holder, but from coordination among the several patent own-
ers of a distinct technology. When several parties have contributed to the development of
the technology and therefore own exclusion rights, commercialization of such a technology
requires access to the complete bundle of intellectual property. In the extreme case, single
patent rights are perfectly complementary, when a single exclusion rights has no economic
value in itself. The right to the benefits from technology is associated with the right to
use it. This right to use is implicitly granted, when all patent owners jointly resign their
exclusion rights. However, when the ownership to the technology is fragmented, each
distinct IP holder has the incentive to skim off the complementarity gain. Each patent
holder therefore induces a negative externality on other parties in the bargaining process.
Compared to a situation when a single inventor developed the entire technology (Shapiro
2001, Lerner and Tirole 2004), the charged licensing fees increase with the number of
parties that have exclusion rights to the technology. This specific reincarnation of double
marginalization within vertical chains is called royality stacking.
Cockburn et al. (2010) find evidence for licensing expenditures of downstream innova-
tors to be increasing with fragmentation of intellectual property. Nevertheless, there is
still a heated debate to what degree the innovation process is actually affected by frag-
mented exclusion rights. Since the answer to this question depends on the size of arising
transaction costs, quantifiable empirically evidence is warranted. Case-study evidence for
the US Biotech sector suggests that these concerns may be exaggerated (Walsh et al.,
2004). Murray and Stern (2005) find evidence for a modest anti-common effect for dual
knowledge that diffuses within academia as well as within the commercial intellectual
property sphere. Contrarily, Magerman et al. (2011) do not find such a anticommon
effect for patent-paper pairs. Graff et al. (2003) document a dramatic restructuring of
the plant breeding and seed industry (from a diffuse to a tightly vertically integrated
industry structure) in order to exploit complementarities between intellectual property of
breakthrough technologies. Noel and Schankerman (2007) find that firms active in more
fragmented technologies have lower market valuations. When innovative firms anticipate
potential transaction costs from fragmented technology ownership, the following hypoth-
esis emerges:
H2: Investments in complementary assets decrease with the degree of fragmentation of the
respective technology.
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3 Empirical Section
3.1 Data and Variable Definitions
The data set is obtained from three different data sources: the Mannheim Innovation
Panel (MIP), firm-level information from Creditreform (Germany’s largest credit rating
agency) and patent data from the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. My sam-
ple is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)8, which is a stratified random
sample of German firms. The survey is based on the concepts and definitions of OECD’s
Oslo Manual (2005) for collecting data on innovation processes and targets legally inde-
pendent firms with at least five employees. My sample refers to information of German
corporations in the manufacturing sector for the years 1993 to 2006. Due to lacking in-
formation on some explanatory variables, data referring to 1999 and 2000 does not enter
the sample. The MIP asks firms about their additional gross investments in fixed assets.
Separated thereof, investments associated to innovation projects is asked. The latter in-
cludes acquisition of advanced machinery, facilities, software and external knowledge (like
in-licensed patents) in order to realize innovation projects. Information on investive inno-
vation expenditures is separated from total innovation expenditures and expenditures for
R&D. I investigate whether these innovation-related investments depend on characteris-
tics of the patent landscape in which the firm is active. The effect of patent landscape
characteristics on innovation-related investments is contrasted with their effects on resid-
ual investments, since they should only show an effect on the former if they represent
a transaction cost phenomenon. This focus on characteristics of the patent landscape
results in a sample in which only firms enter that had applied for patent protection at
least once. One important characteristic of the patent landscape is the capital endow-
ment of patent owners. Therefore, balance-sheet information from Creditreform is linked
to patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO). This provides information
on patent applicant’s non-current, tangible assets (like property, plant and equipments)
and ‘Other Shareholder Funds’ available to them. The item ‘Other Shareholder Funds’ is
the difference between total equity and shareholder deposits and reflects therefore com-
pany’s accumulated cash-flows. Creditreform gathers this information from publications
of annual balance sheets. Since only corporations are obliged to publish this information,
I restrict my estimation sample to corporations, too.
Commercializations of innovations can be held up credibly when the patentee suffers less
sunk costs and her exclusion right overlaps with the employed technology. Walsh et al.
(2004) have documented that US biotech firms anticipate transaction costs and redirect
their R&D efforts accordingly. However, biotechnology is an emerging market with many
8See Janz et al. (2001) or Rammer et al. (2005) for a more detailed description of the Mannheim
Innovation Panel.
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commercial applications yet unexploited. In more mature technologies, such a redirection
of innovation activities may be more difficult (cf. Harhoff et al., 2008). According to
the diffuse entitlement theory (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), anticipated transaction costs
should be reflected in reduced investments in innovations. In order to anticipate such
transactional hazards, screening ex ante for owners of exclusion rights is necessary. The
absorptive capacity literature (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990) points out that internal
R&D facilitates the identification of relevant external technology. Backward references in
firm’s patent portfolios show such patent rights that are essential for business activities.
Access to these technology is necessary when firms aim to introduce innovations. Since
EPO policy is to enumerate a minimum number of references (Michel and Bettels, 2001),
cited patents are presumably valuable. Its economic value in conjunction with its overlap
to firm’s business activities makes in-licensing likely.
Differences in sunk capital between technology suppliers and downstream innovators can
cause transaction costs from hold up threats. Both market sides have incurred different
kinds of non-recoverable investments. Downstream innovators invest in specific machinery
and equipment whereas patent owners invest in R&D. The former is closest matched by
tangible fixed assets (e. g. Antra`s, 2003). R&D expenditures, on the other hand, consist
of wages for scientists and engineers and the necessary research materials and equipment.
German accounting rules prohibit to capitalize these expenditures. They have an imme-
diate surplus effect. Although R&D expenditures resemble non-recoverable investments
very closely, they are not treated as investments in the balance sheets. The irreversibility
of R&D makes external funding difficult and expensive. Internal liquid funds are therefore
usually the preferred mean to finance R&D (e. g. Hall, 2002). The accumulated cash-flows
over time and therefore the capacity to finance R&D are reflected in balance sheets by the
item ‘Other shareholder funds’, i. e. by the difference between total equity and invested
equity from shareholders.
In order to obtain balance sheet information on the owners of cited patents, data on patent
applications at the EPO is linked to data of the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP). The
MUP is a firm-level database collected by Creditreform, the largest credit rating agency in
Germany.9 Since 1999, the MUP reflects a full copy of Creditreform’s data-warehouse. It
can be assumed that this data covers nearly all firms economically active in Germany. In
the preceding years, the MUP reflects Creditreform’s entire firm-level data on firms active
in Eastern Germany as well as newly established firms. The stock of Western German
companies is included as stratified random sample.10 The standardized applicant names
9See Almus et al. (2000) for a more detailed description of the Mannheim Enterprise Panel.
10Thus, capital stock characteristics of patent applicants from Western German firms before 1999 are
subject to measurement error. However, these measures rely on a random sample of the company stock.
Furthermore, since patenting activity is mainly explained by firm size (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and
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of the Patstat database are used to account for varying subsidiaries that file for patent
protection on behalf of a conglomerate.
Starting from the patent portfolio of the observation in the respective year, I determine the
set of European patents that have been referenced to. From this set, I exclude all patents
that are older than 20 years (which is the maximum duration of patent protection in
Europe) and all self-owned patents. The applicants of this set of patents are assigned bal-
ance sheet information from Creditreform on their tangible fixed assets and the amount
of ‘Other Shareholder Funds’. This information is gathered from the MUP and Cred-
itreform’s balance-sheet database Dafne. Since the set of cited European patents issued
during 30 years, year-specific balance-sheet information is not available for all patents and
their applicants. Year-specific balance-sheet information is imputed on the basis of the
closet available data. Then, I calculate the average stock of fixed tangible assets or the
average stock of other shareholder funds, respectively, of patent owners that have been
cited by the firm. This average is weighted according to the number of patent applica-
tions of each cited patent owner. The hold-up rationale predicts that with an increasing
difference of capital stocks between innovating firm and cited patentees, the pressure the
potential innovator suffers from a failure of licensing negotiations increases. Accordingly,
specific investments in innovation should diminish with an increasing capital stock differ-
ence between innovator and patentee conditional on innovator’s own capital endowment.
Innovator’s capital endowment is controlled for by fixed tangible assets per employee or
by retained earnings (in other shareholder funds) per employee, respectively. For robust-
ness checks, I further calculated the difference between innovator’s turnover (number of
employees) and average turnover (average number of employees) among the set of cited
patent owners.
The set of cited European patents and their applicants is further differentiated accord-
ing to citation type, citation frequency and size of the applicant. At the EPO, patent
examiners classify patent citations according their blocking power (Harhoff et al. 2005,
Webb et al. 2005). Citations classified as X- or Y-type threaten to render the application
non-novel or non-inventive. For the sets of cited blocking and non-blocking patents, re-
spectively, the differences in fixed tangible assets between citing firm and average stocks
among cited firms are calculated separately. Hold-up threats also vary according to the
size of the patentee. The difference in fixed tangible assets between the citing firm and the
largest or the smallest cited patent owner, respectively, is therefore investigated. Hold-
up occurs furthermore unexpectedly. The more patent examiners add citations from the
same applicant, the more likely the citing firm is aware of this patent owner. Differences
pure R&D service companies are excluded from my estimation sample, the overrepresentation of newly
established firms should not bias my capital stock characteristics.
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in fixed tangible assets are therefore also calculated between the citing firm and the most
cited patent owner, as well as between the citing firm and average stocks among the 10
per cent least cited firms.
These differences in fixed tangible assets refer to cited European patents only. However,
cited patents can originate from other jurisdictions, too. In order to prevent systematic
distortions, controls that characterize the set of cited patents are introduced. Therefore,
the share of German, European, US and Japanese patents in this set of cited patents is
calculated. Furthermore, balance sheet information on EPO applicants is only available
for German companies. Accordingly, the share of German, European, US and Japanese
applicants is calculated to control for this missing information.
Fragmented ownership to technologies is another characteristic of the patent landscape
that reflects transactional burdens in markets for technologies (Ziedonis 2004). Since
fragmentation of exclusion rights is a (time-specific)11 feature of technologies, Cockburn
et al. (2010) propose a technology-specific measure as weighted average of firm-specific
fragmentations according to the formula:
Fragmentationk =
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
{[1−
J∑
j=1
(
referencesikj
referencesik
)2(
referencesik
referencesik − 1)]} (1)
In this formula, referencesik indicates the total number of backward citations in company
i’s portfolio of patent applications in technology k. referencesikj indicates the number of
backward citations in company i’s subportfolio of technology k that are held by company
j (j 6= i). Nk refers to the total number of companies active in the respective techno-
logy and the last term within the summation refers to Hall’s (2005) bias correction of
Herfindahl-type measures. For my estimations, I will use a firm-level fragmentation index
according to
Fragmentationi =
K∑
k=1
nk
n
Fragmentationk (2)
that is generated as weighted average of technology-specific fragmentation indices. n
refers to firm’s patent portfolio size and nk to the number of patents in a 4-digit IPC
technology-class k.
11For clarity, the time index is omitted in the formula.
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Subsequent sections investigate whether investments of varying degree of technological
novelty are affected by patent landscape characteristics like ownership fragmentation and
differences in sunk capital. Differences in sunk capital between technology suppliers and
innovators can affect bargaining positions in licensing negotiations. However, cited patents
need not to be in-licensed when they already expired. The share of cited patents that are
older than 20 years (which is the maximum duration of patent protection in Europe) is
shall control for technology’s age. Furthermore, the more the innovating firm itself is ac-
tive in R&D, the less she has to rely on in-licensing. Information on firm’s stock of patent
applications at the EPO, her R&D policy (whether she conducts R&D continuously or
occasionally) and her labor costs per employee (as measure for employee’s qualification)
shall control the for varying dependence on licensing. Investment activities are further-
more affected by general firm characteristics. At first by firm’s financial situation which
is captured by the credit rating Creditreform assigns to the firm. Secondly, investments
should be less likely the larger or older the company is already. Variables for firm age
and size are included shall control for these general characteristics. Firm size is thereby
included as number of employees and by a dummy variable whether it is part of a con-
glomerate.
Investments in innovations depend also on the economic value of technology in which the
firm is active. The economic value of technology is, however, not directly observable to the
econometrician. The applicant herself should have a more accurate view on the economic
value of the technology. This assessment is revealed by applying the same technology for
patent protection in several jurisdictions (Putnam 1996). Such a patent family is called
triadic, when protection is sought at the three major patent offices; at the EPO, at the
USPTO and the Japanese patent office. I calculate the share of triadic patents in the stock
of new patent applications per year for each 4-digit technology class as an indicator for
the economic value of the technology class. The value indicator for firm’s patent portfolio
is accordingly created as weighted average of triadic patents firm’s technology classes.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the full sample of 1016 observations. Since
having at least once applied for patent protection is a necessary prerequisite for observa-
tions to be included in the sample, average innovation-specific investment activity is very
high: 87 per cent of observations invest in innovation-specific machinery and equipment.
Observations with investments that are not related to innovative activity achieve a similar
proportion by 90 per cent.12 The prerequisite of having already generated new techno-
12Subsequent estimtation results should therefore be regarded as lower bounds for the effects of frag-
mentation (Cockburn et al. 2010). This is the case because firms that do not have applied for patent
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logical knowledge reflects itself also in sample’s R&D activity. 79 per cent of the sample
is continuously engaged in R&D and only 8 per cent conduct R&D on an irregular basis.
The requirement of being active in patenting is also reflected in the size descriptives of
the sample. 79 per cent of the sample is part of a conglomerate. The mean number of
employees is 3500 with a minimum at 6 employees and maximum at 426k employees. To
take account for the skewness of the size distribution, firm size measured by number of
employees enters the sample in logarithmized scale.13
The fragmentation index is constructed as inversed Herfindahl-index of ownership con-
centration. Correspondingly, a fragmentation measure of zero would indicate all cited
patents are owned by the same applicant whereas a measure of one would indicate that
all patents are owned by different applicants. Firms in my sample face technologies that
are on average very fragmented. The mean fragmentation index lies at 88 per cent with
a minimum at 81 per cent and a maximum at 91 per cent. Hold-up threats are op-
erationalized as difference between sample firm’s capital stock and the average capital
stock of cited patent owners. Surveyed information shows an average stock of tangible
assets of e320 mln. These sample firms report median tangible assets of e20.5 mln and
a maximum amount of e36 bln. In contrast, German patent applicants at the EPO have
reported mean tangible fixed assets of e174 mln in the same reference periods. The
maximum amount of fixed assets reported by a patent applicant lies at e50 bln. The
fact that large firms are more active in R&D and patenting will therefore reappear when
calculating the difference of capital assets between sample firms and their cited patent
owners, since the size distribution of German patent applicants is even more skewed than
its sample counterpart. Sample firms have on average invested by e886 mln less than
the average of cited patent owners. This negative difference in conjunction with the large
extreme values (at the minimum, sample firms have e12 bln less tangible assets and at
the maximum they have e10 bln more tangible assets reported than the respective owners
of relevant patents) points to the important role large, global corporations play for patent
applications at the EPO. This difference between own and potential technology suppliers’
capital stocks can solely proxy for hold-up threats when own capital stocks is controlled
protection could be affected by fragmention even more severly, since they lack own patent rights as bar-
gaining chips. In the extreme case, these firms could go out of business due to failure of obtainting
licenses. Estimated effects for differences in sunk capital between patentees and innovators should be
regarded as lower bounds, too. However not so much because of sample selection concerns, but because
cited backward references are known to the innovator. Having relatively more sunk capital than the own-
ers of cited patents operationalizes the hold-up pressure in licensing negotiations between them. However,
unexpected patent owners could hold up, too (Reitzig et al. 2007). Hold-up threats from such entities
are in fact more severe, since firm’s unawareness of them could lead to situations in which they further
invested in specific capital, which makes them even more susceptible to expropriation.
13Firm size could potentially introduce an endogeneity bias. Measuring firm size in number of em-
ployees should minimize these concerns in my opinion. The regulated labour market in Germany causes
high adjustment costs. It can therefore be assumed that firms smooth their labour input over time.
Unfortunately, the unbalancedness of the survey prohibits a direct econometric test of this presumption.
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for. Sample firms have on average invested e80k per employee in tangible fixed assets
and accumulated cash flows in the ‘Other shareholder funds’ item amount to e50k on
average per employee.
Capital stock differences between sample firms and patentees that they cite in their patent
portfolio are further differentiated by the size of the cited patentee, by the frequency she
receives citations and the type of citations. At the EPO, citations to the state of the
art are usually added by the patent examiner. Patent examiners classify them according
to their blocking power. Patent applications are (threatened to be) non-novel or non-
inventive if citations are classified as X- (or Y-) type (Harhoff et al. 2005).? Owners of
blocking patents are on average by e557 mln larger than their citing sample counterpart.
Owners of not blocking patents are larger on average than owners of blocking patents.
Non-blocking patent owners are on average e816 mln larger than their citing sample
firm (compared to e557 mln). Furthermore, capital stock differences to the largest and
smallest patent owner among the set of cited patentees are investigated. Sample firms
have on average e2.9 bln less fixed assets reported than the largest cited patent owner.
Despite a shift of the range of sample values to the right, sample corporations still report
on average by e300 mln less fixed assets than their smallest upstream patent owner. The
high costs of receiving patent protection at the European level (e. g. van Pottelsberghe
and Francois, 2006) refrain small firms and firms that are not active in the international
market apparently from seeking patent protection at the EPO. A further differentiation
criterion is the number of citations upstream patent owners receive from the sample firm.
The most cited patent owner is interestingly comparatively small. Sample firms are only
by e464 mln smaller than the respective patent owner.
Besides investments in the adaptation of fixed tangible assets, differences of sunk invest-
ments between innovators and patentees can also be due to unequal R&D expenditures.
R&D expenditures are usually funded internally. Therefore, I calculate the difference
between observation’s and average patentee’s ‘Other shareholder funds’. This balance
sheet item reflects equity that has not been invested by shareholders. It reflects therefore
the accumulated cash flows over time. Unfortunately, information on this item is rare.
Regressions on this item have to rely on a reduced sample of 508 observations. Table 3 in
the appendix shows its descriptive statistics. Besides losing extreme value observations in
residual investment intensity and invested equity intensity, the reduced and full sample
are qualitatively similar. The same is true for a subsample of firms that reported in previ-
ous MIP waves that they acquired external knowledge and/or conducted external R&D.
The qualitatively similar descriptive statistics of the latter sample are shown in table 2.
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Besides external technology, firms can employ internally generated technology in inno-
vations. The more technology is available internally, the less the necessity to rely on
external technology markets with its associated transactional hazards. The size of firm’s
patent portfolio is therefore introduced as control in my estimations. Sample firms have
on average applied for 424 patents. Since the maximum lies at more than 28k patent
applications, the variable is introduced in logarithmic scale. Differences in sunk capital
between cited patent owners and citing innovators can affect bargaining positions in li-
censing negotiations. However, not all cited patents need to be in-licensed nor is balance
sheet information available for all citations. In-licensing is not necessary when the re-
spective patent protection already expired. On average, 32 per cent of the citations refer
to patents that were applied for more than 20 years ago. Balance sheet information on
applicants’ capital stocks is obtained from matching patent data with firm-level data from
Creditreform. This data refers to the stock of firms in Germany. Thus, there will be no
capital information for foreign firms that have no German subsidiary. In order to prevent
these missing observations to create systematic distortions, the authority that granted
patent protection and the inventor origin of backward citations are included as control
variables. The European patent office refers overwhelmingly to patents granted by the
EPO herself in order to define the state of the art, against which the patent application
is evaluated. 74 per cent of patent citations refer to European patents. Application lan-
guage has apparently an impact on cited references, too, since the second largest group
are German patents.14 A similar picture is revealed when investigating inventor location
of the technology that is referenced to. European and German inventors are the largest
groups among backward citations in EPO patents.
Large parts of my sample are companies from the chemical industry and from electrical
and mechanical engineering. Cross-sectional econometric studies suffer the drawback of
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Subsequent explanatory variables are attempts to reduce
this heterogeneity. The capacity to invest depends on the extent of shareholders’ invested
equity and accumulated cash-flows. In order to control for the extent to which firms
are financially constraint (Kaplan and Zingales 1997) information on their rating from
Creditreform is introduced. This rating scale ranges from 100 to 500 of which the for-
mer constitutes the best rating and the latter the worst one. Firms in my sample are
financially sound, since they hold a mean rating of 182 with a standard deviation of only
52. Refrained investments due to financial constraints is therefore unlikely to introduce
heterogeneity biases in my estimations. Investments into innovation aim ultimately to
increase expected productivity. Investment activity is cyclical in firm age (Cooper et al.
1999). Logarithmized age and its square shall capture these dynamics in the 12 reference
periods. Since firm’s technology and factor endowments determine productivity, firm’s
14Patent families count as patents for each jurisdiction. Therefore, the sum of shares does not equal 1.
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factor endowments have to be controlled for in regressions on investments. Besides in-
formation on physical fixed assets and available liquid funds, labour input is therefore
included. Doms et al. (1997) find evidence that ‘that the most technologically advanced
plants paid their workers higher wages prior to adopting new technologies’ (see also Chen-
nels and van Reenen, 1998). Endogeneity biases from simultaneously determined factor
inputs should be limited, consequently. My sample shows a high dispersion of labour costs
per employee and year which could reflect such heterogeneity in technological capacity.
The mean of e50k is accompanied by a minimum of e4k and a maximum of e170k.
Instead of productivity or productivity growth (which is virtually not related to invest-
ments), heterogeneity of this kind drives investment behavior (Power 1998). Furthermore,
an indicator for Eastern German firms is introduced, since economic conditions and firm
performances still differ markedly between the Western and Eastern part of Germany
(e. g. Czarnitzki 2005).
3.3 Econometric Results
Specifity of investments and contractual uncertainty are the main prerequisites for trans-
action costs to be relevant. We have discussed the prevalence of the latter in section 2. De-
spite the fact that transaction costs should not arise in the absence of specific investments,
this is rarely taken into account in empirical investigations of transaction cost phenomena
(Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). In order to discern transaction costs phenomena from other
spurious effects, the influence of the patent landscape on innovation-specific investments
is contrasted with its impact on non-specific, non-innovation-related investments. Invest-
ments in innovation are further distinguished according to their degree of technological
novelty. Specific investments in innovation comprise R&D expenditures that shall gener-
ate new technological knowledge as well as investments that aim at commercializing given
new technologies in innovative products or processes. Probit frameworks estimate corre-
spondingly the probability to conduct R&D, innovation-specific or residual investments.15
Table 5 reports mean marginal effects from Probit estimations on investment probabili-
ties.16 Specific, innovation-related investments are separated from residual, non-specific
investment activities and from investments in R&D. This is done for three different sample
sizes. Besides the full sample of 1016 observations, a further subsample of 876 observations
includes solely firms for which is known from pre-sample information that they have expe-
rience in acquiring external knowledge and/or in external R&D. Transaction cost concerns
15See section A in the appendix for further details on the employed estimation technique.
16Heteroscedastic Probit regressions for innovative and residual investments cannot reject the hypoth-
esis of no heteroscedasticity in the full sample when the stratification criteria size and industry sector
are introduced as heterogeneity explaining variables. This is not the case for the R&D regressions. R&D
Probit regresssions are therefore clustered according to the stratification criteria.
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should be especially relevant for these observations. Introducing the balance sheet item
‘Other Shareholder funds’ as further capital stock characteristic reduces the available sam-
ple to 508 observations. Explanatory power is highest for explaining innovation-related
investment probabilities when the full sample is used. Decreasing sample size is associated
with declining χ2 statistics that test against the null of only a constant regressor. The
same is true when residual investment or R&D probabilities are explained, although on a
much lower level. Explanatory power of residual investment regressions is weak in view
of a majority of innovation-related explanatory variables. Their primary purpose is, how-
ever, to validate that the effects of the former regressions are indeed innovation-specific.
Explanatory power of R&D regressions is low because of fewer explanatory variables.
Potential endogeneity concerns lead me to omit explanatory variables from the R&D re-
gressions. For instance, whether financial constraints (expressed by firm’s credit rating)
cause a reduction in R&D or whether firm’s rating is low because it conducts risky R&D
is unclear. Furthermore, firms usually smooth R&D activities whereas physical invest-
ments are lumpy and cyclical. Firm age is introduced to control for these dynamics and
is consequently omitted in the R&D regressions.
Firm’s R&D policy have the largest impact on explaining innovation-related investments
followed by firm age and firm size, whereby the positive effect of age decreases quadrati-
cally. The prevalence of references to expired patents and the prevalence of triadic patents
do not exhibit significant effects on propensities to invest in innovation. Firms active in
more valuable technologies do, however, R&D with significantly higher probability. Con-
trol variables for the authorities granting the referenced patents and for their inventor
locations are not reported in the regression tables to improve clarity, but are nevertheless
included in the regressions. The share of references to patents granted by the German, by
the Japanese and by the European authority have significant negative impacts on invest-
ment in innovation. References to US patents positively affect investment in innovation.
Inventor location of referenced patents has minor effects on investment. Solely referenced
patents of European inventors affect investments in innovation regularly negatively. In
order to empirically capture hold-up threat’s impact on specific investments, the effect of
differences in capital stocks between observations and relevant patent owners has to be
conditional on observation’s own capital stocks. Fixed capital stocks per employee and
‘Other Shareholder Funds’ per employee do not show up significant effects´on probabil-
ities of physical investments. Larger physical capital stocks per employees do, however,
negatively affect the probability to conduct R&D.
Fragmentation negatively affects the probability to invest in innovation-specific assets on
a 10 per cent level of significance for the reduced and in-licensor sample and on 5 per
cent level for the full sample. Increasing the fragmentation index by one percentage point
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decreases the mean probability of specific investments by 1.2 to 2.2 percentage points.
Difference between own and average patentee’s fixed capital stocks shows highly signifi-
cant effects in the full and in-licensor sample. Including furthermore differences in ‘Other
Shareholder Funds’ diminishes this effect. Approximating the marginal effect of changing
from the worst to the best bargaining position reveals that capital stock differences tend
to have larger quantitative effects on the probability to invest in innovation than frag-
mentation. The fragmentation index shows a range of 10 percentage points from 0.81 to
0.91. Such change from the least to the highest fragmentation changes the probability to
observe innovation-specific investments approximately by 12 to 22 percentage points. The
difference between own and an average patentee’s fixed capital stocks has a range of e22
bln. Estimated marginal effects range from 7×10−6 to 2×10−5. In the worst bargaining
situation, innovators report fixed tangible assets that exceed the one of an average patent
owner by e10 bln. In their best bargaining situation, cited patentees report fixed assets
that exceed their own by e12 bln. Switching from the best to the worst bargaining sit-
uation reduces the investment probability by approximately 15 to 44 percentage points.
These changes in probability do not indicate a complete breakdown of technology adop-
tion as postulated by the tragedy of anticommons (Heller 1998).
Capital stock differences between upstream patentees and downstream firms affect only
physical, innovation-related investments. Non-specific investments and investments in
R&D are not affected. Fragmentation exhibits a negative effect on firm investments also
for innovation-specific, physical investments only. Residual, physical investments are not
significantly affected by fragmentation in all three samples. Investments in R&D are,
however, positively correlated with technology fragmentation at a 10 per cent significance
level for in-licensing firms. If the impact of single firm’s patent policy on fragmentation
can be neglected (what is likely the case since the measure is created on the technology
level), this positive effect is inconsistent with a transaction cost rationale (e. g. Clark and
Konrad, 2008). The disappearing effect of the technological value indicator suggests that
fragmentation reflects partly competition in valuable technologies which in turn stimu-
lates R&D. A certain degree of ownership dispersion may thus be necessary in order to
ensure technology competition. On the other extreme, Lichtman (2006) challenges the
anti-common view of patent thickets by noting that the expropriation potential of single
patentees diminishes with the number of other patent holders in the thicket. Whether
such non-linear fragmentation effects are present with respect to innovation-related, physi-
cal investments is investigated in Table 6. Introducing fragmentation further non-linearly
renders its effects on investments in innovation insignificant in the full and in the in-
licensor sample. Only in the reduced sample, in which there are no significant effects of
capital stock differences, the linear and non-linear fragmentation effects are weakly signif-
icant. The negative linear fragmentation effect diminishes non-linearly, whereby former’s
18
coefficient quantitatively dominates the non-linear effect.
Cockburn et al. (2010) have shown that the effect of upstream fragmentation on down-
stream innovation depends on downstream firm characteristics. They provide evidence
that fragmentation affects primarily in-licensing firms and firms with small patent port-
folios. Table 7 presents estimation results on samples differentiated by patent portfolio
size.17 The median number of 28 patent applications is used to divide the full and the li-
censee sample into firms with small and large patent portfolios. This excercise furthermore
serves to validate the operationalization of ownership fragmentation, since fragmenation
measures following Ziedonis (2004) frequently work well for large firms with large patent
portfolios, but perform poor with regard to small firms. I find that only firms with small
patent portfolios are affected by upstream fragmentation. Fragmentation negatively af-
fects their propensity to invest in innovation whereas there is no such an effect for firms
with large portfolios. Especially firms with small patent portfolios should be affected
by IP fragmentation, since their small portfolios are minor bargaining chips in licensing
negotiations between various IP owners (cf. Hall and Ziedonis 2001). Firms with large
patent portfolios are, however, not left unaffected by patent landscape characteristics.
Hold-up threats should be especially relevant for firms with large patent portfolios since
larger patent portfolios should exhibit larger overlap with other patents and since large
patent portfolios are usually owned by larger firms with corresponding higher expropri-
ation potential. If there are such hold-up concerns present in the innovation process,
the larger the downstream innovator compared to upstream patent owners the higher the
expropriation risk and the lower, ceteris paribus, the probability to invest specifically in
innovation. Indeed, I find highly significant effects of capital stock differences for firms
with large patent patent portfolios, whereas there are no such effect for firms with small
patent portfolios. Patent thickets effects are thus not uniform and depend on downstream
firm characteristics.
Capital stock differences between upstream and downstream firms are necessary but not
sufficient for hold-up threats. It has to be investigated whether presented evidence is due
to specific capital and that it does not reflect pure size effects. Large firms may, for in-
stance, be less inclined to invest in innovation because they suffer opportunity costs from
replacing own business with non-innovative goods. (Arrow, 1962). In such a case, firms
that are larger than patent-owning firms would refrain from innovating not because of
vertical transactional considerations but because of horizontal size effects. Table 8 inves-
tigates whether size differences (measured in number of employees) to upstream patent
17Small size of the reduced sample hinders me to conduct regressions on this sample for firms with
large patent portfolios. Results for firms with small patent portfolios in this sample nevertheless confirm
the results in other samples.
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owners affect firm investments. Differences in size do not show significant effects on spe-
cific R&D or innovation-related investments. Solely residual, physical investments are less
likely in the reduced sample with increasing firm size relative to upstream patent own-
ers. Table 9 presents regressions when size differences are measured in terms of sales.18
Here, investments in innovation are negatively affected with increasing relative firm size.
This could indicate that previous capital stock effects are spurious size effects. Including
capital stock differences renders this size effect, however, insignificant. Negative effects of
increasing relative firm size should thus be a capital stock effect and not a size effect.
Tables 10-12 differentiate capital stock effects according to characteristics of the upstream
patent or patentee. Patent examiners classify references to prior art according to their
power to block the patent applications. References classified as X or Y can render the
application non-novel or non-inventive. Owners of such prior art patents can thus block
usage of technology in which the sample firm is interested in apparently. Differences in
sunk capital between the sample firm and the patentee should be especially relevant in this
case. Remaining non-X and non-Y references, on the other hand, indicate patents that
are not capable to block the patent application. They rather indicate prior art technology
that is built upon and further developed in cumulative and sequential way. Table 11
shows that the difference to the average capital stock of blocking and non-blocking patent
owners, both, significantly reduce the probability of innovative investments to quantita-
tively similar degrees. Although owners of cited non-X or non-Y patents could not block
the patent application, technology usage could still be blocked when technologies are cu-
mulative and sequential. R&D and residual physical investments are still not affected by
capital stock differences to blocking and non-blocking patent owners.
Instead of relying on the average capital stock of cited patent owners solely, the effects
of capital stock differences to the smallest and largest cited patent owners are clarified.
These effects should be more pronounced for differences to the smallest firm than to the
largest firm. Both differences significantly reduce investments in innovation whereby the
marginal effect of the latter is indeed smaller than the former. There are no negative
effects on R&D or residual, physical investments. On the contrary, the larger the sam-
ple firm compared to the largest cited patent owner the higher its R&D propensity on a
10 per cent level of significance. This increased R&D propensity of already large firms
could reflect first-mover advantages in evolving technologies. Small patent owners pose
in particular hold-up threats (Reitzig et al., 2007). The increasing propensity to invest in
non-specific, physical assets with increasing capital stock difference to the smallest cited
18In order to have consistent size measures, labor cost and capital intensity are introduced as normalized
to sales-variables. Furthermore, sales regresssions exhibit heterogeneity in industry and size. Standard
errors are clusters according to these stratification criteria.
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patent owner could reflect substitution patterns towards non-expropriable assets.
In addition to measures of sunk capital according to citation type and size of cited patent
owner, they are further differentiated according to the number of citations upstream
patent owners receive from the sample firm. One measure includes only the 10 per cent
citations-quantile of cited patent owners in the calculation of the average capital stock
of upstream patentees. The other capital stock measure is restricted to the difference to
the most cited patent owner. Hold-up threats can affect innovation only when there is
uncertainty about the distribution of intellectual property rights. Capital stocks of sel-
dom cited patent owners proxy for the sunk capital of such residual patent owners. On
the other hand, downstream firms should be well aware of frequently cited patent owners
and therefore adjust their investment policies accordingly. Differences in capital stock
to seldom cited patent owners reduce highly significantly innovative investments but not
R&D or residual physical investments. On the other hand, capital stock differences to the
most cited firm do not affect investments in R&D and innovation. Only residual physical
investments are positively affected by differences in capital stocks compared to the most
cited patent owner. This should reflect the technological exclusivity that the upstream
patentee enjoys and an according adjustment of downstream’s business policy.
These effects could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with ex-
planatory variables. Hausman tests are carried out for the subsamples for which fixed-
effects estimations are feasible. Fixed-effects estimations ‘difference away’ time-invariable
unobserved heterogeneity at the cost of losing observations that are not observed adja-
cently. Hausman tests on regressions on investments in R&D, innovation and residual
investments, respectively, cannot reject the hypothesis that fixed effects logit and random
effects logit estimators yield equal coefficients on a 10 per cent significance level. Thus,
there is no evidence that endogeneity biases the results.
4 Conclusion
Patent’s ability to foster innovation can be limited when sequential and cumulative R&D
results in so-called patent thickets. This study investigates by which mechanism patent
thickets could stifle innovation. It searches for evidence whether such patent landscape
characteristics affect specific investments in R&D and innovation.
Possessing complementary assets (e. g. production facilities for innovative goods) is fre-
quently regarded as advantageous for innovating firms in technology transactions, since
technology suppliers face expropriation risks when these assets serve as gatekeepers to
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the commercialization of technology (Teece 1986, Gans et al. 2002). However, when de-
ciding to invest in such specialized assets (Wernerfelt 1984), the innovating firm has to
take market imperfections in the market for technology into account, too. Two kinds of
transaction costs could hinder adoptions of technology in innovations: royality stacking
and hold-up threats. The former stems from fragmented ownership to technology whereas
the latter originates from differences in sunk capital of the market sides. Having a higher
amount of sunk capital than a holding-up patent owner worsens the bargaining situation
of the downstream firm and increases her expropriation risk. Backward citations in firm’s
patent portfolio are used to identify upstream patentees of business-relevant technologies.
This set of business-relevant patents is used to construct empirical proxies for ownership
fragmentation and differences in sunk capital between upstream patentees and the down-
stream firm. Fixed capital stocks shall thereby act as (imperfect) proxy for the amount
of sunk investments (e. g. Antra`s, 2003).
I find evidence for both, ownership fragmentation and capital stock differences, to affect
the probability to invest in innovation negatively. These effects on innovation-specific,
physical investments are contrasted with effects of ownership fragmentation and capital
stock differences on innovation-specific, intangible investments (i. e. R&D) and residual,
physical investments. For these investments, I do not find comparable effects. The effect
of differing capital stocks on innovative investments seems also not to be a size effect.
Capital stock differences affect innovative investments negatively irrespective whether
they refer to blocking or non-blocking patent owners or to large or small patent owners
(although the marginal effect of being larger compared to the largest cited patent owners
is the smallest). Capital stock differences to seldom cited patent owners affect innovative
investments also negatively, whereas there is no such an effect for capital stock differences
to the most cited patent owner, which is consistent with a downstream adjustment of
business policies according to available technology.
The negative effects of upstream patent thickets on downstream innovation are not uni-
form. Firms with small patent portfolios reduce investments in innovation as a result
of ownership fragmentation. Capital stock differences do not play a significant role for
them. Building large patent portfolios is a defensive measure to insure business’s freedom
to operate (Grindley and Teece 1997). Large patent portfolios can serve as bargaining
chips in multilateral licensing negotiations when ownership is fragmented and lacking
them makes firms more vulnerable to exclusion (Cockburn et al. 2010). Firms with large
patent portfolios appear, however, not to be entirely shielded from the negative effects
of patent thickets. Differences in capital stocks have a strong negative impact on their
propensity to invest in innovation. Large patent portfolios offer more overlap possibilities
for residual patent owners. Furthermore, establishing large patent portfolios reveals that
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a certain expropriation risk is conceived that can be leveraged when the excluding patent
owner has less sunk capital. Despite these negative effects of patent thickets on down-
stream innovation, the evidence does not suggest a complete breakdown of technology
markets due to market imperfections as suggested by the tragedy of anticommons (Heller
and Eisenberg 1998). Patent thicket characteristics change investment probabilities in the
worst case by approx. 15% to 45%.
Although I find no evidence that these effects are driven by spurious correlation, this study
is surely not without limitations. At first, I am able to identify solely owners of relevant
technology, that the firm developed further in a cumulative and sequential way. So called
patent trolls (see e. g. Reitzig et al. 2007) are accused to deliberately hide their exclu-
sion rights in patent thickets. These entities pose further hold-up threats which are not
incorporated in my empirical study. Further research has to show whether their presence
significantly affects adoptions of technologies in innovation. Uncertainty in intellectual
property does not rely necessarily on the presence of opportunistic parties. Therefore,
future research has to verify the role of uncertainty regarding validity and scope of patent
rights on hold-up threats and technology diffusion. Furthermore, this study suffers a
frequent drawback that the parties in licensing negotiations are not directly observable.
Information on technology licensors would allow to investigate, for instance, whether re-
peated interactions are able to mitigate hold-up threats.
The importance of intellectual property not only to refund R&D investments but fur-
thermore to secure usage rights to basic business technology has been emphasized in the
literature since Grindley and Teece (1997). Such threats to exclude competitors also fos-
tered views to unlock hidden value in intellectual property (Rivette and Kline, 2000).
However, when all participants are aware of this game, the escalating patent portfolio
race in complex technologies ends up to be purely defensive. The resulting mutual block-
ades leave all participants worse off. The negative effects of ownership fragmentation
could indicate that the majority of market participants is indeed aware of this game. Be-
sides being aware of IP’s importance for own freedom to operate, firms and policymakers
should support coordination efforts among various owners of technologies. Patent pools
and standard-setting organization provide such a forum for coordination. Future research
has to show whether these fora actually promote innovation.
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A Estimation Technique
Propensities to invest are estimated by the Probit discrete-choice framework (see e. g.
Greene 2005). The latent net-benefit from investing y∗ is estimated as linear function of
the explanatory variables x and an error term ν that is independent of x:
y∗ = β′x+ ν.
Since we cannot observe the latent net-benefit y∗, the estimation equation has to be re-
formulated in terms of the observable investment decision y.
y =
1 if y∗ > 00 if y∗ ≤ 0
When F ( ) denotes the cumulative distriubtion of the error term ν, the conditional
probability that observation i has decided to invest is given by P (y∗it > 0) = P (ν >
−β′xit = F (β′xit)). The estimatated likelihood function for a sample of N individuals
is then given by:
L =
N∏
it=1
F (β′xit))yit [1− F (β′xit)]1−yit
Since estimated coefficients from this likelihood are not easily interpretable, my estima-
tion results provide the sample average of marginal effects. According to
∂E(y|x)
∂xj
=
P (y∗ > 0)
∂xj
= F (β′x)βj
the marginal effect of an explanatory variable xj is the marginal change of the expected
probability to observe a positive outcome, when the respective explanatory variable xj is
changed by a marginal unit.
A frequent problem in econometric panel studies is the assumption of unobserved effects to
be random noise. Systematic differences between the units of observations could, however,
be subsumed under this random noise, too. It is therefore reasonable to decompose the
overall error term ν into a cross-sectional, time-invariant component ui and a remainder
ηit: νit = ui + ηit. Conditional on this unobserved heterogeneity, the probability to invest
is then given by:
P (y∗i > 0) = P (ηit > −β′xi − ui = F (β′xi − ui)).
i
Under the assumption that ui is strictly exogeneous to the explanatory variables x and is
distributed according to G( ), the log-likelihood can be expressed in its marginal form by:
logL =
N∑
i=1
∫ t=1∏
T
F (β′xit − ui)yit [1− F (β′xit − ui)]1−yitdG(u|σu)
When G( ) and F ( ) are normally distributed, the above equation shows the estimation
of the random-effects probit model. This random-effects likelihood is unconditional on un-
observed heterogeneity and depends on the (normalized) parameters β and the variation
parameter σu of G( ). This estimator relies on the strong strict exogeneity assumption.
Fixed effects expressions of the likelihood (conditional on ui) may be more appropriate,
when there are doubts on this assumption.
In linear econometric models, fixed-effects transformations can eliminate this unobserved
heterogeneity and circumvent thereby the resulting incidental parameter problem when
the likelihood is conditional on ui and the time-dimension is asymptiotically fixed. How-
ever, for non-linear models, usually no such transformations exit. Fortunately, a consistent
fixed-effects estimator exits for the panel-logit model, when G( ) is normally distributed
and F ( ) logistically distributed (see Hsiao, 2002 for more details). Wheter the assump-
tions of the random effects specification are met will be tested using the Hausman test (see
e. g. Wooldridge, 2002). When the hypothesis of an unbiased random effects specifica-
tion is correct, estimated coefficients from the fixed-effects- and random-effects-approach
should not differ significantly.
Since the Hausman tests cannot reject the hypothesis that estimated coefficients from
the fixed-effects and random-effects framework are asymptotically equal in the discrete
choice models, I do not further discuss the difficulties encountered in truncated regressions
from spurious correlations between individual heterogeneity and explanatory variables (see
Hsiao, 2002 for a discussion of alternative approaches).
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B Data
iii
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample
Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum
Investments in Innovation 0.87 0.34 0 1
Residual Investments 0.90 0.30 0 1
Fragmentation Index 87.98 1.43 81.34 90.91
∆ Fixed Assets§ -886 1460 -12213 10184
∆ Other Funds§ -227 934 -10196 5804
∆ No. of Employees -512 17627 -47180 422627
∆ Sales§ -772 4953 -22379 82656
∆ Fixed Assets ...
... to X or Y-References -557 1471 -23920 10162
... not to X or Y-References -816 1387 -10752 10193
... to largest cited patentee -2948 5867 -59821 7698
... to smallest cited patentee -300 1364 -10752 13640
... to seldom cited patentees -510 1243 -10752 12764
... to most cited patentee -474 1377 -10752 4087
Share Expired Patents 0.32 0.15 0 0.82
Share Triadic Patents 0.82 0.13 0.27 1
ln(Patent stock) 3.54 1.67 0 10.25
Occasional R&D activities 0.08 0.28 0 1
Continuous R&D activities 0.79 0.41 0 1
Share of Citations from DE Authority 0.24 0.10 0 0.63
Share of Citations from EU Authority 0.74 0.10 0.38 1
Share of Citations from US Authority 0.18 0.08 0 0.50
Share of Citations from JP Authority 0.03 0.05 0 0.50
Share of Citations to DE Applicant 0.63 0.12 0.27 1
Share of Citations to EU Applicant 0.33 0.12 0 0.86
Share of Citations to US Applicant 0.16 0.10 0 0.75
Share of Citations to JP Applicant 0.06 0.05 0 0.42
Credit rating 182 52.04 100 500
Other Funds Intensity‡ 0.08 0.18 0.00 2.36
Fixed Asset Intensity‡ 0.06 0.12 0.00 2.16
ln(No. of Employees) 6.54 1.53 1.79 12.96
ln(Age) 3.63 1.14 0 6.03
Part of Conglomerate 0.78 0.42 0 1
Labour Cost Intensity‡ 0.05 0.01 0.004 0.17
Location in Eastern Germany 0.06 0.23 0 1
Low-Tech Manufacturing 0.35 0.48 0 1
Medium High-Tech Manufacturing 0.46 0.50 0 1
High-Tech Manufacturing 0.19 0.39 0 1
No. of Observations 1016
‡ in emln per employee
§ in emln
iv
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - In-Licensors
Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum
Investments in Innovation 0.91 0.29 0 1
Residual Investments 0.90 0.30 0 1
Fragmentation Index 87.97 1.43 81.34 90.91
∆ Fixed Assets§ -894 1500 -12213 10184
∆ Other Funds§ -200 856 -10184 5804
∆ No. of Employees -113 18731 -47180 422627
∆ Sales§ -636 5126 -22379 82656
Share Expired Patents 0.31 0.15 0 0.82
Share Triadic Patents 0.82 0.13 0.27 1
ln(Patent stock) 3.60 1.70 0 10.25
Occasional R&D activities 0.09 0.28 0 1
Continuous R&D activities 0.83 0.37 0 1
Share of Citations from DE Authority 0.25 0.10 0 0.63
Share of Citations from EU Authority 0.74 0.10 0.38 1
Share of Citations from US Authority 0.18 0.08 0 0.50
Share of Citations from JP Authority 0.03 0.05 0 0.50
Share of Citations to DE Applicant 0.63 0.12 0.27 1
Share of Citations to EU Applicant 0.33 0.12 0 0.86
Share of Citations to US Applicant 0.16 0.10 0 0.67
Share of Citations to JP Applicant 0.06 0.05 0 0.40
Credit rating 179 50.56 100 500
Other Funds Intensity‡ 0.08 0.17 0.00 2.36
Fixed Asset Intensity‡ 0.06 0.11 0.00 2.16
ln(No. of Employees) 6.66 1.50 2.08 12.96
ln(Age) 3.70 1.10 0 5.86
ln(Age)2 14.92 7.43 0 34.28
Part of Conglomerate 0.78 0.42 0 1
Labour Cost Intensity‡ 0.05 0.01 0.008 0.17
Location in Eastern Germany 0.03 0.18 0 1
Low-Tech Manufacturing 0.34 0.47 0 1
Medium High-Tech Manufacturing 0.47 0.50 0 1
High-Tech Manufacturing 0.20 0.40 0 1
No. of Observations 876
‡ in emln per employee
§ in emln
v
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - Reduced Sample
Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum
Investments in Innovation 0.87 0.34 0 1
Residual Investments 0.90 0.30 0 1
Fragmentation Index 88.08 1.41 81.34 90.84
∆ Fixed Assets§ -828 1300 -10752 6160
∆ Other Funds§ -442 1267 -10196 5804
∆ No. of Employees -461 13020 -47180 141908
∆ Sales§ -749 4228 -22379 30804
Share Expired Patents 0.32 0.15 0 0.82
Share Triadic Patents 0.82 0.13 0.36 1
ln(Patent stock) 3.59 1.66 0 9.59
Occasional R&D activities 0.09 0.28 0 1
Continuous R&D activities 0.80 0.40 0 1
Share of Citations from DE Authority 0.24 0.10 0 0.63
Share of Citations from EU Authority 0.74 0.10 0.38 1
Share of Citations from US Authority 0.19 0.09 0 0.50
Share of Citations from JP Authority 0.03 0.05 0 0.50
Share of Citations to DE Applicant 0.63 0.12 0.27 1
Share of Citations to EU Applicant 0.34 0.12 0 0.85
Share of Citations to US Applicant 0.17 0.10 0 0.50
Share of Citations to JP Applicant 0.05 0.05 0 0.22
Credit rating 176 50.20 100 500
Other Funds Intensity‡ 0.08 0.19 0.00 2.36
Fixed Asset Intensity‡ 0.06 0.12 0.00 2.16
ln(No. of Employees) 6.67 1.64 2.08 11.90
ln(Age) 3.74 1.09 0 6.03
ln(Age)2 15.15 7.48 0 36.40
Part of Conglomerate 0.72 0.45 0 1
Labour Cost Intensity‡ 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.17
Location in Eastern Germany 0.05 0.21 0 1
Low-Tech Manufacturing 0.32 0.47 0 1
Medium High-Tech Manufacturing 0.49 0.50 0 1
High-Tech Manufacturing 0.19 0.39 0 1
No. of Observations 508
‡ in emln per employee
§ in emln
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